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New demands for EU spending: justifiable or fanciful? 




The aim of this paper is to examine how expenditure from the EU budget on new classes of 
public goods could help to address major demands on policy after the end of the 2007-13 
Multi-annual Financial Framework, formally agreed in 2006. It starts by discussing principles 
for preferring the EU level and their limitations as a guide to decision-making, an exercise 
that builds partly on insights from first- and second-generation fiscal federalism, but also 
brings in political economy considerations. The paper then looks specifically at two areas of 
economic governance in which it is frequently claimed that the current low level of EU 
spending is simply not commensurate with the aims the Union has set itself and has embodied 
in its principal co-ordination processes. These are how to secure a transition to a low carbon 
economy (part of both the Sustainable Development Strategy and the evolving Energy Policy 
for Europe) and how to underpin efforts to boost productivity growth as part of the Lisbon 
strategy. The main message from the paper is that although the EU budget could, and 
probably should, be orientated more towards these aims as part of a more coherent approach 
to economic governance, hard choices will be needed in deploying what is certain to remain a 
limited policy instrument. 
1 Introduction 
There is widespread agreement that the EU budget is out-of-date, ill-suited to the emerging 
demands on the EU and, worse, trapped by path dependencies that severely circumscribe the 
options for change. In the words of Italian economists Buti and Nava (2003: 1) it is ￿a 
historical relic￿. As any Italian knows well, however, relics can endure for centuries with 
subsequent generations ready to cherish and adapt them, rather than knocking them down and 
starting again. The shortcomings in the budget have been extensively rehearsed and it can 
sometimes appear as though there are, indeed, features that are preserved for purely historical 
reasons, rather than because they meet the needs of the present (see, among many others: Le 
Cacheux, 2005 and 2008; Begg, 2005 and 2007). Equally, the EU budget has to contend with 
an environment in which there is no easy answer to the question ￿what is the EU for?￿, and in 
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the absence of an unambiguous vision of what the finalitØ politique of the Union is likely to 
be, it should not be surprising that it is hard to find an agreed direction for reform of the 
budget, let alone to discern a finalitØ budgetaire. 
The aspects most criticised include the continuing prominence of the Common Agriculture 
Policy (CAP) in expenditure, the increasing opacity of (and dubious rationale for) 
￿corrections￿ that diminish the net contributions of certain Member States, a lack of flexibility 
(especially in responding to new challenges), and other flaws in governance including the 
legitimacy of the processes of decision-making. More generally, what is absent from the 
debate on the EU budget is a convincing sense of where the EU level should fit into a system 
of multi-level public finances. At 1% of EU GNI, the EU level￿s spending is only a small 
proportion of aggregate public spending in the union which is around 40% of GNI, Thus, 
despite being a large figure (currently around ￿130 billion, larger than the GNI of a number of 
the smaller Member States), it is just 2.5% of public spending. As Jonas Eriksson pointed out 
in a recent SIEPS paper (Begg, Sapir and Eriksson, 2008: 9) ￿to say that its economic impact 
is significant would be a serious exaggeration￿.  
In typical federal systems, the highest level of government will be responsible for a sizeable 
proportion of public expenditure and taxation. Thus, in the US, it is in excess of 20% of GNI
2 
and the proportions in other major federations are of similar orders of magnitude. Figure 1 
shows the broad breakdown in a range of countries between central and sub-national 
government in both revenue and expenditure. Although the chart shows that federal countries 
such as Canada, Australia and the US tend to assign more public finance functions to lower 
tiers of government, it also demonstrates that sizeable delegation also happens in unitary 
states. Moreover, other work by the OECD (notably through its Network on Fiscal Relations 
across Levels of Government and the publications flowing from the network￿s activities) 
suggests that there is something of a global trend towards decentralisation. 
Perhaps more importantly, the federal level of government plays a pivotal role in systems of 
public finance, with fairly well defined hierarchies of administration. These roles have been 
extensively theorised and analysed in the literatures on fiscal federalism and multi-level 
governance. In practice, the central government in unitary states also fulfils similar functions, 
so that although the term ￿federal￿ is often used in the academic literature, the relevant 
distinction is between central and sub-national government. The question that then arises, and 
which this paper addresses, is whether this literature can inform the debate on reform of the 
EU budget. Fiscal federalism is about more than tax and spending arrangements and, thus, 
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something of a misnomer, to the extent that it ￿is concerned with the division of policy 
responsibilities among different levels of government and with the fiscal interactions among 
these governments￿ (Wildasin, 2008). 
1.1  The 2008/9 review of the budget  
Considerable effort has been expended on trying to define how the EU budget should be 
reformed, and the slow-burning 2008/9 review has provided an opportunity to approach the 
issue from first principles. For the Commission (2007), the starting-point should be policies, 
and the consultation paper published to launch the review sets out a range of areas in which 
EU spending could be expected to support the achievement of policy objectives. Others have 
argued that EU spending should be subject to the rigorous application of the principle of 
subsidiarity, implying that it should occur only when there is a demonstrable benefit from 
assigning the spending to the supranational level. In fact, the UK government contribution to 
the consultation proposes that EU spending can be justified only when three tests have been 
passed: demonstrable added value from spending at EU level; ensuring that the outlays are 
proportionate to the task; and that the EU spends the money effectively (HM Treasury, 2008). 
The 2008/9 budget review - still, at the time of writing, too low on the ￿to-do￿ list of the 
European institutions to be completed - might have been, and could still be, a once-in-a-
generation opportunity to reform the budget in line with the priorities of today and tomorrow, 
rather than yesterday. As such, it might be expected to take more account of underlying 
economic and political theories. But it has, so far, been over-shadowed by other political 
priorities. Initially, the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty inhibited any debate on the 
budget because of the perceived risk that an injudicious statement from ￿Brussels￿ would be 
seized on by the ￿no￿ campaign, and even in the aftermath of the negative result, there have 
been few leading politicians willing to adopt firm positions while a solution to the ratification 
was sought. Subsequently, the economic crisis has, not unreasonably, been the principal pre-
occupation of the EU￿s leaders.  
The upshot is that the review is running out of political time and space, bearing in mind that 
the five year mandates of the current Commission and Parliament expire in 2009. As a result, 
the original approach to the review, which was to concentrate on principles and policies rather 
than on money, is likely to be overtaken by the early skirmishes on the next Multi-annual 
Financial Framework (MFF) that will be needed once the present one covering 2007-13 ends. 
This would be unfortunate and it is to be hoped that it will still be able to draw on underlying 
principles rather than being caught in the customary dogfight over money (and money back).   4
1.2  Aims and outline of the paper 
This paper focuses on the sorts of shifts in the pattern of expenditure inside the EU budget 
that can be justified, taking into account such concerns as subsidiarity, added value and 
proportionality, and on whether public expenditure at the EU level in these areas can be 
effective. A related issue is how extensive the overall spending envelope for these purposes 
should be and the implications for the structure of EU financing, especially the balance 
between direct spending and loan finance through bodies such as the European Investment 
Bank. The second section of the paper looks afresh at the principles for assigning policy to the 
EU level, drawing especially on fiscal federalism and multi-level governance. The subsequent 
two sections assess the potential for using the EU budget, first, to bolster productivity and, 
second, as an instrument for supporting a transition to a low carbon economy. A concluding 
section recalls the well-known realities of budget negotiation in the EU, highlighting some of 
the decision-making dilemmas that arise, and suggests a way forward. 
2  Conceptual models for a supranational budget 
According to Riker (1964: 101), the essence of federalism is that each level of government 
has ￿some activities on which it makes final decisions￿. This characterisation raises the 
perennial question of whether the EU can be regarded as a level of government equivalent to 
the standard models as found in the US, Germany and other well-established federal nation-
states, but also suggests a means of portraying EU finances. While it is self-evident that the 
EU is a long way from being a federal system and the ￿f￿-word remains taboo for many 
Member States, it is nevertheless worth looking at the extent to which it has federal 
characteristics.  
There is an extensive and well-developed literature on the merits of federal systems in 
delivering public goods (for a recent overview, see Inman, 2007) that has resonance for  the 
EU, Indeed, James Madison, in Federalist Paper No. 46, eloquently debunks the idea that the 
states have to fear a more powerful centre: ￿the powers proposed to be lodged in the federal 
government are as little formidable to those reserved to the individual States, as they are 
indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Union￿.  
For Rodden (2006a: 5) ￿the promise of federalism is a straightforward proposition that has 
shown up time and again in political and economic theory from Montesquieu to James 
Madison to Richard Musgrave: In heterogeneous societies, government policy is most likely 
to be aligned with the preferences of citizens in the presence of multiple layers of 
government, each charged with different responsibilities. Higher-level governments can 
provide federation-wide collective goods like common defense and free trade, while lower-
level governments can provide goods like trash collection and religious education that will be   5
consumed locally. If each layer of government stays within its bounds and respects the 
authority of the other, citizens can hold each layer of government separately accountable for 
its activities￿. He also notes that it necessarily means a weaker centre, something that 
manifestly applies in the EU. But on another criterion, namely the probability that the centre 
will bail out the sub-national level, the EU doubly fulfils Rodden￿s ideal. Not only does it 
have no capacity as a fiscal authority to do so, but the monetisation of Member State debt by 
the European Central Bank is explicitly forbidden in the Treaty. 
2.1  Fiscal federalism as a guide 
Fiscal federalism, especially, might be expected to offer insights into how the EU budget 
should evolve and ought to be pivotal in theorising and understanding the public finances of a 
multi-level governance system such as the EU. Wildasin (2008) states, perhaps stretching the 
point, that the EU ￿can be viewed as an emerging federation in which EU-level political and 
fiscal institutions are gradually developing￿. He also reiterates the division of labour 
suggested by what he calls a ￿broad normative consensus￿ that the highest level of 
government (a status he argues could be conferred on the EU) should normally be responsible 
for stabilisation policy and for distributive policies, whereas allocative policies should be 
situated at the level of government ￿whose jurisdictional boundaries are co-terminous with the 
geographical scope of the regions affected by these policies￿.  
Other prominent scholars have also noted the EU￿s gradual evolution in a federal direction: 
for example, Inman (2007: 523) states that the EU ￿is now moving albeit slowly, towards a 
more integrated political union founded upon federal principles of governance￿. Although it 
might be argued that the mood in recent years has swung markedly against political union on 
federal lines, the budget is one of the most visible manifestation of the EU as an inter-
governmental phenomenon. An earlier paper by Gramlich and Wood (2000) argued that 
although some aspects of fiscal federalism can readily be discerned in the EU￿s development, 
the unique nature of the EU￿s development calls for fresh approaches that more convincingly 
capture the fiscal arrangements of the Union. It is this sui generis character of the EU that 
makes it so difficult to apply the more standard precepts of fiscal federalism. 
What fiscal federalism addresses has been set out by Bird (2003) who argues that it comprises 
the following: 
•  Expenditure assignment: who should implement which spending programmes 
•  Revenue assignment: who should levy which taxes 
•  How to mitigate vertical imbalances between the revenues and expenditure of sub-
national government   6
•  Whether and how to offset horizontal imbalances between needs and capacities of units at 
the same level 
•  Who determines the capacity to borrow and according to what rules 
•  The nature of the underlying political and institutional system and its ability to settle 
differences. 
Bird argues that efficient governance is achieved by applying the ￿matching principle￿, under 
which ￿benefit areas￿ are matched by ￿financing areas￿. In so doing, he reaffirms the well-
established principles of Oates (1972 and 1999) who pioneered work on fiscal federalism and 
continues to be a leading contributor. Bird also asserts that the aim should be to decentralise 
as far as possible, a principle he equates with subsidiarity as used in the EU. 
However, even the briefest inspection of how public finances in the EU are arranged reveals 
that there is scarcely any resemblance between the public finance model of the EU and that of 
any of the US, Switzerland, Canada or Germany, four countries which have featured 
especially prominently in the academic literature on fiscal federalism. Hence, an 
uncomfortable conclusion from most attempts to apply insights from such theories is that the 
very particular circumstances of the EU do not fit well with standard approaches. As Vito 
Tanzi argues in a recent key-note paper presented to a major conference on fiscal federalism, 
the theory has two substantial shortcomings (Tanzi, 2007). First, it does not offer a 
convincing template for analysing delegation upwards to supranational institutions, despite 
the fact that such institutions are playing an increasingly influential role in economic 
governance. As he puts it, ￿We have been spending too much time looking down from the 
central government’s layer. It is time to look up from that layer￿. The EU has by far the 
greatest reach of these institutions and, although much of its activity is regulatory, could 
reasonably be expected to have expenditure functions that extend well beyond what it 
currently does. Second, Tanzi stresses that the relationships between tiers of government 
typically reflect historical developments and compromises, much more than design based on 
principles rooted in theoretical approaches such as fiscal federalism. Nevertheless, the 
political or institutional logic that gave rise to the existing frameworks can become ill-adapted 
to new circumstances. He therefore criticises the notion that there is an optimal fiscal 
arrangement that can be embodied in a constitutional settlement. 
In addition, much of the attention in the standard fiscal federalism models concerns how a 
substantial and powerful central government mediates between multiple sub-national units. 
This, plainly, is not a convincing description of the inter-governmental relations in the EU 
where the small scale of the supranational tier and its highly skewed functions bear little 
resemblance to the theoretical model of a central government. In the EU, it is the budget of   7
the single supranational authority which is the outcome of the wrangling between powerful 
central governments. In the standard model, the issues of vertical and horizontal equalisation 
loom large, and there are heated debates about the most suitable forms of inter-governmental 
grants yet, in the EU setting, the most contentious issues concern Member State net balances 
and whether or not the EU level should have any autonomy in its revenue raising.  
Second-generation fiscal federalism 
More recent work has shifted somewhat from the normative preoccupations of FGFF to 
explore in a positive manner the incentives facing government at different levels. In much of 
what has been dubbed ￿second generation fiscal federalism￿ (SGFF), the academic literature 
suggests that careful analysis of incentives and of the inter-play between market forces and 
the public sector is needed in allocating expenditure functions (see: Oates, 2005; Weingast, 
2006). Weingast (2006), citing a number of other studies, argues that a key innovation in 
SGFF is to focus on the growth-enhancing effects of the model of fiscal decentralisation, 
rather than the equity effects emphasised in FGFF. Could it be that the EU budget is too little 
orientated towards growth (which would arguably boost the EU￿s coffers) because financing 
by inter-governmental transfers diminishes incentives to promote public goods and increases 
incentives to engage in side-payments? 
Common-pool problems are emphasised in SGFF ￿ see also Osterloh et al. (2007). They arise 
where the incentive facing a decision-maker is how to secure (whether for constituents or for 
interests the decision-maker wants to favour) a disproportionate share of the public goods 
produced by a higher level of government. With a common pool, an absence of fiscal 
equivalence may lead to under-provision of public goods if the tax-payers are few and well-
organised to sow division among many beneficiaries. If the Member States are regarded as the 
taxpayers, the EU could be said to conform to this model. By contrast, the common-pool 
problem when there are many tax-payers and few beneficiaries is that the latter, if well-
organised, can extract more than their fare share, the more so if they are the decision-makers.  
The constitutional or institutional design will then be influential. Thus, in the EU, the 
unanimity that applies to the budget can accentuate common pool problems, especially for 
veto players (for example, small Member States) that can exercise greater power than if they 
had to compete for resources on the basis of population or economic weight. Side-payments 
(or, more pejoratively, resort to ￿pork barrel￿ payments, as so often seen in US budgetary 
settlements) are then needed to make agreement possible. If decision-makers, in addition, are 
beholden to specific constituencies for votes or influence, then they can make common cause 
to capture budgets. It does not take 20-20 vision to see the CAP through this lens. SGFF 
again, sees fiscal equivalence as the solution.    8
Soft budget constraints are also a form of common pool problem because they facilitate 
shifting of the costs of obtaining public goods and services. However, the main sense in 
which this phenomenon manifests itself in the EU, is that its substantial regulatory output and, 
latterly, different forms of policy co-ordination lead to obligations that the Member States or 
sub-national governments have to finance. A possible deduction here is that the EU will tend 
to be too active because it knows that it will not have to fund the resulting expenditure. This 
suggests something of a paradox that having too small a budget at EU level leads to higher 
aggregate public expenditure. In some federal settings, according to Weingast (2006), central 
governments exhibit predatory behaviour that expropriates the benefits of decentralisation. 
There is no immediately obvious way in which this applies to the EU, but it may be a feature 
that deserves further investigation. 
Weingast (2006), in his summary of the differences between FGFF and SGFF stresses that 
they are complementary rather than alternatives. But he also emphasises the importance of 
revenue raising by sub-national government and, as a second stage, of ensuring that the 
government in question has to find most of the marginal costs of new spending. Generally, the 
challenge for reform of the EU budget is to ascertain to what degree the notion of market 
enhancing expenditure central to SGFF is not only influential, but also relevant in a small 
budget which has to reconcile so many conflicting political aims (Enderlein, 2007). 
2.2  Implications for the EU budget 
There are both conceptual and empirical issues ￿ and, inevitably, disagreements ￿ about how 
to frame the EU budget in the light of the theoretical models and their implications for good 
policy design. The differing views on federalism make it almost impossible to derive 
uncontested theoretical propositions that can guide the EU budget. As Rodden (2006b: 2) 
bluntly puts it, ￿the prevailing view of federalism as a clean division of sovereignty between 
higher and lower-level governments is giving way to a notion that authority over taxation, 
expenditures, borrowing, and policy decisions is inherently murky, contested, and frequently 
renegotiated between governments, with federal constitutions analogized to the ￿incomplete 
contracts￿ of industrial organization theory￿. For this reason, it may be over-optimistic to 
expect that a convincing design for the EU budget can be elaborated from first principles.  
Much of the literature on fiscal federalism and multi-level governance assumes a clear 
hierarchy of government, let alone governance. It follows that attempting to apply the insights 
and tools derived from this literature to the political and economic choices around the EU 
budget is not easy. Yet, in some areas, lessons can be drawn, not least in assigning 
responsibilities for public expenditure and inter-governmental transfers among tiers of 
government in a manner consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. The challenge in the 
highly politicised context of the EU is to establish in what circumstances (bearing in mind the   9
small size of the budget) the principle can be convincingly applied. Instead, the question 
becomes one of trying to work out to what degree the underlying principles can inform the 
choices about what expenditure should be undertaken by the EU level and how it should be 
financed. 
A key issue to resolve is, thus, whether the conventional interpretations of allocation and 
distribution, if not stabilisation, can so readily be applied to the EU. Distribution in EU terms 
is not, in the first instance, inter-personal ￿ the essence of the approach adopted in fiscal 
federalism ￿ but among Member States. Indeed, there is no presumption that cohesion policy 
will benefit households in the lowest deciles of the income distribution; instead, its primary 
effect in the lexicon of the fiscal federalism model is to act as a form of fiscal equalisation, 
albeit one that straddles allocative and distributive aims. 
These insights must colour how EU expenditure, as an instrument of economic governance, is 
understood and applied. One reading is that most of today￿s EU budget is distributive (namely 
the CAP and cohesion) and that true European public goods are a minor share. Others contend 
that objectives such as food security or the spreading of economic development have public 
good attributes and thus that it is an exaggeration to classify these policies in their entirety as 
distributive. 
There is now something of a consensus that the EU is not on course to become a United 
States of Europe, and thus the federal level of a multi-level governance system. Granted, it 
has acquired and continues to accumulate considerable regulatory powers, consistent with 
Majone￿s (1996) notion of the regulatory state. Granted, too, there is a demand to rethink the 
expenditure competences that the EU is assigned. But all of this is within the rather limited 
sphere of an EU level subject to much more restrictive constitutional limits on its ambitions 
than apply to federal nation states. Consequently, Tanzi (2007) is surely correct to argue that 
the emergence of the supranational level as a significant, but often narrow policy actor 
represents a qualitatively new phenomenon that fiscal federalism struggles to accommodate. 
In practice, the allocative function of the EU budget is primarily about the case for EU level 
public goods, but is adjusted to allow for transfers between Member States, a function that is 
very different from the inter-personal redistribution that features in fiscal federalism. 
2.3  Subsidiarity applied: the Ecorys report 
The most extensive recent study of the expenditure side of the budget has been done by 
Ecorys, CPB and IFO (2008) ￿ hereafter, the Ecorys report. It looks at the rationale for the 
existing and prospective future EU spending from the perspective of public finance theory 
and the principle of subsidiarity and, not surprisingly, concludes that were these principles to 
be applied rigorously, substantial changes in the structure of spending would be justified.   10
Throughout, in the study, the broad approach taken is to find reasons not to assign public 
spending competence to the EU level.  
The study builds on the straightforward subsidiarity test developed by Ederveen et al. (2008) 
which poses the question hierarchically: 
1.  Is action at the EU level necessary to achieve the stated aims? 
2.  Can it be achieved by co-ordination of national efforts? 
3.  Even if EU level expenditure is justified, how much is needed to ensure a proportionate 
response? 
But the two questions that then arise are, first, how to justify change and, second, how to 
refocus EU spending. Concepts such as subsidiarity and proportionality, or the assertion that 
EU spending must be confined to policies for which there is a demonstrable added value, can 
sound too abstract to be operational. Even if they deserve to be more prominent in shaping the 
EU budget, there are tough obstacles to applying them. The status quo is powerful and the 
lobbies that underpin the continuation of policies such as the CAP are highly effective.  In 
addition, the EU budget manifestly still has a role to pay in smoothing the (bumpy) road 
towards European integration by transferring resources between Member States as part of 
grand bargains. These may be parcelled up inside policies that have worthy objectives 
(cohesion as a public good), but are inevitably susceptible to the pork-barrel politics of juste 
retour thinking. A further constraint is the size of the budget because, so long as the budget is 
set at about 1% of GNI, entire categories of public spending are effectively excluded from 
consideration, irrespective of political or efficiency arguments for shifting them upwards. 
Typically, federal budgets account for 10% or more of GNI and even the much smaller 
￿federal-light￿ budget of 5%-7% discussed in the MacDougall report looks like fantasy. 
Even if a moderate increase to 1.3% or 1.5% of GNI is contemplated, there is no easy way to 
use theoretical models to arrive at an objective list of what should be in the EU budget rather 
than at other levels of government. The Ecorys report made a rigorous effort to apply its 
extended subsidiarity test and reaches plausible conclusions about the relative merits of 
assigning different classes of public spending to the supranational level. It proposes three 
￿packages￿ as underlying narratives for a reformed EU budget: 
•  Climate change and energy 
•  Knowledge and innovation 
•  Common security and foreign affairs 
Each has its merits, but the key point is that they are alternatives, and choosing one rules out 
the others. The remainder of this paper looks at how a future EU budget might concentrate on 
a narrow, but politically salient and economically rational set of tasks. Two that stand out are   11
dealing with climate change and responding to the competitive challenges associated with 
globalisation ￿ even as the model itself comes under stress as a result of the economic 
downturn. But the EU could equally find a resonance in enhancing its role in external action, 
security matters and common foreign policy. Adding the budgetary costs of all these areas 
together, and taking into account the need for some inherited elements of spending to 
continue, would greatly overload the EU budget, especially if it is to remain at around 1% of 
EU GDP, which emphasises the hard choices that will be required. The next two sections look 
at competitiveness and climate change in more detail. 
3 Competitiveness  and  productivity 
For the Commission it is, arguably, the Lisbon strategy which has been its core ￿project￿ since 
2005. The strategy is, first and foremost, about structural reform of the EU economy and the 
principal aims include shifting the EU towards knowledge intensive activities, boosting the 
employment rate, better regulation and, generally, the enhancement of market disciplines. 
Although the merits of a market-dominated approach to supply-side policies has been 
questioned as a result of the perceived impact of market failures in the 2008/9 downturn, the 
broad thrust of policy is not likely to change greatly in the coming years. The weaknesses on 
the supply-side of the EU economy have been documented and analysed extensively in 
numerous reports by the OECD, the European Commission and other bodies, and there is no 
need to go over all the familiar ground on the diagnoses of what needed to be done. Instead, 
the principal challenge is to translate diagnosis and strategising into effective implementation. 
In this regard, primary governance imperatives are how to relate the Lisbon strategy to other 
major policy initiatives, given that it was, especially in its first five years devoid of real policy 
instruments, including a meaningful budget.  
Various contributions, of which the Sapir report (2004) was perhaps the most prominent, had 
sought to emphasise the importance of re-orientating the budget much more towards growth 
promoting policies, and much of the subsequent political spin has been devoted to showing 
that the 2007-13 MFF was, indeed, a budget for ￿growth and jobs￿. Certainly, the budget was 
presented in a new way to highlight growth and competitiveness and the fact that in 2008, for 
the first time, expenditure on competitiveness aims exceeded CAP spending was presented as 
compelling evidence of the shift. However, the latter claim is only justifiable if the whole of 
the cohesion budget is deemed to be in support of competitiveness.    12
Certainly, the current round of cohesion policy includes an obligation 60%
3 of spending has 
to be on projects that support the aims of the Lisbon strategy. Yet it is remarkable that over 
the entire span from 1988 - when the budget underwent major reform - to the projected 
figures for 2013, some three-quarters of EU spending has consistently gone to the CAP 
(including the so-called second pillar which supports rural development as opposed to direct 
payments to farmers) and cohesion.  
What, then, might a future budget contain that can contribute to competitiveness objectives? 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Ecorys report is rather ambivalent about the case for more EU 
spending in these areas. However, it is partly a matter of definition. In the study, the headings 
of expenditure under discussion cover several relatively small budget lines that bear on 
competitiveness (the internal market, taxation and customs, external trade, and the 
competitiveness and innovation policies overseen by DG Enterprise), but not R&D which is, 
in fact, the largest element of line 1a (Competitiveness for growth and employment, i.e. the 
non-cohesion elements) in the current budget. The report does, by contrast, emphasise the  
Internal market spending (0.05% of the budget today) is predominantly administrative and 
analytic, and there is little scope for public investment in this area. Similarly low amounts are 
spent on taxation and customs, competition policy, and on external trade policy, in all of 
which the main tasks are, again, administrative. It could be argued that trade promotion might 
be an area that could benefit from collective action, but there are evident national sensitivities 
to take into account. The competitiveness and innovation policies do embrace a number of 
spending programmes, as well as administrative expenditure and are much the biggest of the 
five categories discussed. However, it is important to note that the programmes in question 
are principally about diffusion ￿ especially to SMEs ￿ rather than the knowledge creation 
implicit in R&D programmes funded elsewhere in the EU budget. This leads the authors of 
the Ecorys report to argue that there is not a strong case for boosting EU spending in this area, 
notably because the risks are slender of spillover effects inducing Member States or localities 
to under-invest in such policies. 
These arguments have some force, but are also open to criticism. Cross-border co-operation 
between SMEs can be an important channel for diffusing innovation, suggesting a case for the 
EU level to provide resources to achieve it. Similarly, in an increasingly globalised 
knowledge market, mechanisms funded at EU level for linking companies and research 
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institutes, could be helpful. In both cases, what the EU level is best equipped to do is to 
develop programmes that open doors. 
4  Responding to climate change 
There is a budding consensus that climate change concerns mean that a business-as-usual 
(BAU) scenario for the character of EU growth is no longer tenable and that economic 
governance will, henceforth, have to be much more concerned with the quality of growth and 
not just with expansion per se. Indeed, there are already strong indications that one of the 
consequences of the 2008/9 economic downturn will be a recasting of the capitalist model 
towards the ￿green￿ economy. For these reasons, a post-2010 framework for economic 
governance is likely to have to place policies to curb carbon emissions more firmly at the 
centre of policy-making and will need to be coherent across policy areas.  
The Stern Review (2007) has been very influential in translating the scientific debate into 
economic analysis. The Review, together with subsequent work by Stern (2008), also 
highlights the long timescales needed for action and thus the imperative of acting now, rather 
than waiting for the effects of climate change to show themselves. It will have to involve a 
profound change in the relationship between energy use and GDP, implying sharp reductions 
in the energy intensity of GDP and in the carbon intensity of energy. The scientific analysis 
suggests that to limit global temperatures to an increase of no more than 2” Celsius, the 
concentration of carbon in the atmosphere has to be capped at 500 parts per million or lower. 
Global emissions would need to fall progressively to reach 50% of current levels by 2050 just 
to stabilise the amount of carbon in the atmosphere, while lowering them would be even more 
demanding.  
But the opportunities it will afford also have to be stressed, notably the prospect of the 
creation of a substantial number of ￿green￿ jobs and the emergence of new sectors of activity.  
EU policies will have a central role in a comprehensive approach, going well beyond the 
Energy Policy for Europe with its ￿20-20-20￿ approach. Thus, in the evolution of the Lisbon 
strategy after 2010, low-carbon objectives can be expected to feature much more prominently 
than hitherto, while cohesion policy will be under pressure to go much further than it has 
already in supporting initiatives to counter climate change. If such a qualitative change 
occurs, it is bound to have ramifications for the budget which will need to play its part in 
promoting the desired changes. 
4.1  Why the EU budget? 
The magnitude of the changes required points to the need for a novel approach to governance, 
including re-thinking whether EU expenditure can play a pivotal or catalytic role. Equally, 
funding elements of a carbon abatement strategy at the EU level requires a robust economic   14
justification, and will have to complement what is done at other levels of government and by 
private agents. 
Many of the standard economic arguments for assigning spending competences to the EU 
level are especially apposite for countering climate change. One is that if a single Member 
State is unable to appropriate the full benefits from investment in public goods it will invest 
less than is socially optimal; another is that there may be economies of scale from investment 
at a more aggregated level. 
In standard welfare analysis a pure public good is one which can be shared completely and is 
thus non-rivalrous in the sense that the benefits of the good obtained by one individual (or, 
perhaps more tellingly in the EU context, one Member State) do not detract from the benefits 
accruing to others. By the same token, no individual can be left out, so that pure public goods 
are also non-excludable, with benefits flowing to all citizens, irrespective of circumstances. 
Prevention of climate change fits this characterisation closely.  
Treating carbon abatement as a public good in this way has a number of policy implications. 
First, there has to be agreement on what constitutes a public good, although it can be argued 
that dealing with climate change will confer benefits on all parties and leave no-one out. 
Much of the carbon reduction agenda is, par excellence, about ￿commons￿ that affect people 
across the globe: a tonne of carbon emitted into the atmosphere has exactly the same effect 
wherever it originates. 
Second, the corollary of carbon abatement being non-excludable is that individuals (or 
countries) then have no incentive to pay, as they can free-ride. Third, there is a delicate 
balance to be struck or a need for multi-lateral co-operation if a revolt by tax-payers in 
countries which do act, or are under pressure to act, is to be avoided, leading to systematic 
under-spending on the public good. 
4.2  How much money and on what? 
There are many initiatives to abate carbon emission for which a plausible case for EU 
budgetary support can be made on the basis of analytic criteria. In principle, different 
categories of spending could be ranked according to their ￿scores￿ on a range of relevant 
criteria, such as the scope for added value from EU level spending, the cost effectiveness in 
terms of volume of carbon abated and the aggregate impact. Such an exercise would be 
useful, but would be expected to identify more projects than could be supported by a limited 
budget. Hence it is inevitable that decisions on which to assign to the EU budget will reflect 
political judgements as well as purely analytic considerations. 
It is important to note that the EU budget already funds policies that contribute to carbon 
mitigation, although it is not easy way to work out how much is being spent at present. The   15
main budgetary headings under which there are outlays that do so are cohesion, rural 
development, energy, transport, research and external action. Totting up the various 
programmes, the current annual level of such spending is estimated to be in the range ￿4-10 
billion out of a total budget of ￿129 billion. The explanation for the range is that certain large 
items of EU expenditure contribute only indirectly to carbon abatement (notably support for 
rail building). It is also noteworthy that the European Investment Bank (EIB) lends substantial 
amounts for rail infrastructure. 
Actions to support lower carbon emissions can be on both the demand side and the supply-
side of the economy; and some will have short-term benefits, while the pay-off from others 
will take much longer. The trouble, though is that once the easy options are exhausted, more 
controversial changes will be needed if the EU is to make progress towards an aggregate as 
high as 80% cuts and difficult compromises will have to be brokered. Given that there is, as 
yet, no credible alternative to oil-based fuels for transport, other sectors such as electricity 
generation may have to become effectively zero-carbon within two or three decades, and 
there is a compelling case for the EU budget to support this transition.  
Technological developments will obviously loom large in any transition to a low carbon 
economy, but it is important to distinguish between different forms of such investment. Major 
impacts in the coming decade will, principally, stem from improving and diffusing existing 
technologies, but there will be a parallel need to boost investment on known, but as yet 
uncommercial technologies that offer scope for more bigger cuts in carbon emissions over a 
longer time horizon. In addition, there will have to be resources to develop the breakthrough 
technologies that will provide much longer term solutions. 
Even timely carbon abatement projects will not deliver results quickly, so that there is a high 
probability that temperatures will rise over the next two decades. If so, there are likely to be 
calls for public funding to underpin adaptation to effects such as rising sea levels. Care is, 
however, needed to avoid an adaptation strategy diminishing commitments to dealing with the 
underlying problem of rising atmospheric carbon concentrations. 
Nevertheless, there could be a rationale for EU funding for adaptation policies on much the 
same logic as for cohesion policy. Differences in fiscal capacity or in the incidence of carbon 
reduction policies, contingent on the scale of the transformation that is needed in a national or 
regional economy,  could justify such outlays. 
Although it elicits opposition from some environmental interests, a key technology will be 
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), a process which will allow for increased use of coal, 
an abundant and widely distributed primary source of energy that is especially suited to 
electricity generation, but with much lower emissions (see Ansolabehere, S. et al., 2007). EU   16
funding for full-scale demonstration projects has been strongly advocated and the urgency of 
moving quickly has been highlighted (Egenhofer, 2008). 
Many other projects for technological advances, from the grand in scale to the minor, are also 
worth pursuing, so that criteria for allocating resources are required. In general, the approach 
should be to select projects for funding on the basis of excellence rather than picking winners. 
In addition, it should be stressed that it is not only ￿big￿ science and engineering that are 
relevant, but also smaller projects and what might be described as social technologies that 
stimulate energy saving. The adoption of eco-driving techniques, for example, can lower 
petrol consumption by at least 10% 
4.3  Concentrating efforts: the hard choices 
Potentially contradictory criteria bear on where to concentrate inevitably scarce EU resources. 
A value for money test would call for ranking policies according to the public expenditure 
needed per tonne of CO2 abated. But such costs vary over time, whether because of scale or 
learning effects, or because of technological change. It is also important not to overlook the 
potential volume of carbon reduction that can be achieved in different ways and thus not to 
pin too many hopes on cheap options with limited scope.  
In addition, many of the more difficult options will proceed in stages. CCS, for example, can 
be expected to go from very costly piloting and developmental stages, through full-scale 
demonstration to lower cost roll-out. It is also important to allow for underlying regulatory 
changes that may make CCS commercially attractive if an effective carbon price at a high 
enough rate is achieved, whereas in present circumstances investment in CCS will be limited 
without public sector support. An important start has been made with the decision of the 
December 2008 European Council to hypothecate some of the revenue from the EU￿s 
Emissions Trading System to part fund up to 12 demonstration plants, but there are further 
stages to the full-scale operation of CCS that may also warrant public funding, notably to 
finance the necessary pipeline infrastructure. 
Political sensitivities are bound to arise for some potential EU spending. Highly cost-effective 
results in terms of lowering emissions may be attainable from EU spending outside the EU, 
but would face internal objections that spending should be ￿at home￿. A more subtle (but still 
telling, given the EU￿s aspirations to exercise normative power) objection is that it might also 
create the impression that the EU was balking at taking the lead in curbing its own emissions, 
reducing pressure on others to follow. 
There are further political sensitivities around the overall annual spending that could be 
envisaged for carbon abatement, especially the fact that the EU budget today is around 1% of 
EU, which means that if more spending is to go on a strategy to counter climate change, either   17
the overall budget would have to be increased or other policies would have to be squeezed. 
Taking the lower bound of ￿4 billion of current EU outlays on policies that reduce carbon 
emissions as a starting point and three target levels for future spending of ￿15, ￿30 and ￿50 
billion as the bases for scenarios, the consequences for other spending vary substantially. 
With the current total of ￿129 billion, reaching ￿15 billion on carbon abatement policies 
would mean cutting other policies by 11%, while ￿50 billion would mean slashing other 
policies by 46% - equivalent to the entire CAP and rural development budget. There is, 
however, a margin between the present level of the budget and the ￿own resources ceiling￿ 
(set at 1.31% of EU GNI for commitments) which gives room for an additional ￿35 billion 
annually at 2008 prices. In other words, sizeable outlays on climate changes while likely to 
attract opposition, are not beyond the pale. 
Nevertheless, a compelling case for the EU budget to support certain classes of expenditure 
on climate change can be constructed.  For example, the Ecorys report identifies among the 
strong contenders for increased EU level spending several which relate to climate change, 
including transport and energy (for which the report finds a case for a switch from national 
budgets to the EU budget, albeit without necessarily spending more in aggregate) and 
environmental policies (where the report advocates an overall increase in spending). Broadly 
similar conclusions are reached in a paper by Adelle et al. (2008) who also call explicitly for 
EU funding of CCS demonstration plants, while Behrens et al. (2008) are convinced that the 
EU budget should have a leading role in funding policies aimed at countering climate change. 
In selecting a portfolio of carbon-reduction projects to be supported from the EU budget, the 
EU has to balance the short-term and the long-term, the certain and the more speculative or 
experimental, internal measures and support for action elsewhere in the world, mitigation and 
adaptation, and the modalities of implementing policies (especially the degree to which they 
should be embedded in existing expenditure programmes). Some of these will require the 
creation of new funding mechanisms, while others are capable of being incorporated within 
existing procedures or expenditure programmes, such as cohesion policy. 
5 Conclusions 
Theories rooted in fiscal federalism only offer indirect help in determining what should be in 
the EU budget, for the simple reason that too many of the foundations of these theories just do 
not apply in the EU. Yet despite the absence of a convincing theoretical framework, a number 
of principles can be put forward in determining when and how EU money is justified for 
competitiveness or climate change purposes. First, there has to be a demonstrable added value 
from spending at EU level. Simply put: if one euro spent at EU level achieves more, on 
average, than one euro spent at Member State level, there is added value.   18
Second, a European strategy should be focused on public goods with EU-wide benefits and 
the emphasis should be on obtaining the best returns from such investment in public goods, 
irrespective of where they are located in the Union. Attempts to spread spending among 
Member States so as to spread the apparent benefits or to meet targets for net accounting 
balances (juste retour or ￿my money back￿) will risk blurring their purpose. That said, it is 
undeniable that no policy is ever entirely spatially neutral. 
Third, two sorts of co-financing should be contemplated: by Member States and by creating 
new loan funds that private agents can access (for example from the European Investment 
Bank, a potentially significant source of funding for such long-term purposes). 
Fourth, while proportionality (spending should only be as much as is needed to achieve the 
agreed aims) is a sound principle, timing will be critical. Many Lisbon-related aims will 
require early actions at EU level, for example to overcome immediate bottlenecks in networks 
or to put in place the bases for longer-term knowledge enhancement. Similarly, a transition to 
a low carbon economy will require the definition of a trajectory for change, with milestones 
of increasing ambition, so that proportionality may need to be defined as a moving target. 
Fifth, there is some attraction, not least from a political economy perspective, in embedding 
competitiveness or carbon abatement strategies at least partly within existing expenditure 
programmes, especially cohesion budgets, even though there is a risk of overloading the 
latter. Sixth, recognising that business values certainty in the interests of long-term planning, 
the potential contribution of EU spending in establishing a stable framework for carbon 
abatement is also worth stressing.  
Finally, supply-side policies are not just about fixed investment, hard science or engineering, 
but also about the socio-economic context, including the likely impact of structural change on 
employment patterns or of carbon pricing on fuel poverty. These sorts of changes will have 
ramifications for social justice, both within the EU and for other parts of the world, so that EU 
funding to deal with the distributive consequences may well be justified. 
The timing of a scaling-up of responses to the challenges of smoothing supply-side changes in 
the aftermath of the economic downturn or of accelerating carbon-related initiatives also has 
to be considered. Given that a review of the EU budget is in progress and that some Member 
States are open to moderate changes in the composition of EU spending over the remainder of 
the current Multi-annual Financial Framework, the scope for moderate changes in the 2010-
13 period should not be overlooked. Following the precedent of funding being switched to the 
Galileo project and the ￿5 billion energy related package grudgingly agreed at the spring 
2009 European Council, it is conceivable that further small amounts could be shifted towards   19
specific projects linked to carbon reduction. If so, a strong contender would be immediate EU 
funding for construction of CCS demonstration plants. 
5.1  Bringing Lisbon and low carbon objectives together 
Analytic principles suggest that forestalling climate change is a compelling example of a 
public good at the European (and, indeed, global) level, and thus of the sort of expenditure 
that should be more prominent in the EU budget than the some of the public goods currently 
funded, as well as the distributive policies that currently dominate the budget. In addition, the 
EU budget has the potential to be pivotal in financing those public goods which risk being 
under-provided by other levels of government because of political economy considerations.  
Beyond 2013, and assuming further 5 or 7 year MFFs, a key issue is whether ￿low-carbon￿ 
becomes the underlying narrative for both a future Lisbon strategy and the EU budget, or 
what will be needed to make it so. Packages cannot realistically be constructed so far in 
advance of the start of negotiations about money, not least because it will be difficult to 
escape the need for some geographical balance, but the content would be expected to include 
support for:  
•  Technological advances, aimed at boosting energy efficiency, the development of low-
carbon means of generating electricity from coal and hydrocarbons, and boosting 
alternative energy sources. Such advances can also help to underpin EU strengths in the 
￿green￿ economy sectors that may well be where substantial market potential lies. 
•  Investment in new infrastructure needed to distribute alternative forms of energy or to 
facilitate greatly reduced emissions of carbon. Again, there is a potential competitive 
dividend here if the result is to enhance energy productivity in such a way as to reduce the 
cost to businesses of energy use. 
•  Initiatives to promote lower carbon use, through education, exhortation and novel 
approaches to regulation, but also through eye-catching measures that can help to 
consolidate reduction of carbon usage as a routine practice. 
•  Spending outside the EU to assist countries constrained by limited fiscal capacity to 
implement low carbon strategies. 
•  Dealing with the consequences of structural change and climate change, as well as the 
impact of a carbon mitigation policies by funding projects or compensation programmes 
that offset the more extreme negative effects, paying attention to both potential social and 
regional divergences in the impact. 
Whatever, the EU decides to do, it will be part of a budgetary package and thus subject to the 
horse-trading that invariably accompanies EU negotiations. Devising spending packages that   20
respect these principles will be far from easy, yet it should also be recognised that there are 
different configurations of spending that can deliver similar results, leaving ample scope for 
the kind of deals at which the EU excels. In particular, there will be some elements in any 
package that appeal to certain Member States more than others, whether because of political 
preferences or because there is the prospect (or, at least, the perception) of net economic 
gains. If only for this reason, some effort will be needed to sweeten the pill for the countries 
that risk losing some of their current receipts from the budget.  
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